Introduction
The welfare of Þrms in resource-based industries is dependent upon their proÞts that, in turn, depend on their productivity and the level of the natural capital stock. To help understand Þrm and industry behavior over time requires a decomposition into the effects of prices, Þrm capital stock, and productivity on proÞts, adjusted for changes in the natural capital stock. To assist in such analysis, the paper applies a new methodology to derive proÞt and productivity decomposition measures. The approach provides a useful method for assessing the effects of shifts in regulation, level shocks to the natural capital, price ßuctuations and other factors on Þrm and industry performance.
The proposed productivity and proÞt decomposition uses only observed data (rather than estimated "benchmark frontiers") and is derived from theoretical results based on the relationship between the Törnqvist index and the translog proÞt function (Diewert, 1976; Diewert and Morrison, 1986; Kohli, 1990; Kohli, 1991) . The method allows for intra-Þrm comparisons, but can be applied at the industry, regional or national level, and provides insights about Þrm performance and behavior that are unavailable from traditional productivity and efficiency measures based on frontier estimation (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978; Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Diewert and Parkin, 1983; Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994; Greene, 1997; Coelli, Battese and Rao, 1998) .
The proÞt decompositions have a range of potential uses in natural resource and environmental management. For example, by decomposing proÞts or productivity into its contributing components the industry and regulators can identify the most important factors constraining economic performance. Further, benchmarking to the most proÞtable Þrm per resource stock allows individual Þrms to assess the factors preventing increased proÞts or productivity. Decompositions also permit a detailed analysis of whether regulatory change achieves the desired goals, such as increased productivity, by examining the existence of confounding effects, such as increases in input prices. Thus the method is a useful tool for identifying factors that limit proÞtability and productivity and for assessing the impact of regulatory changes in natural resource industries.
Section 2 presents the fundamentals of the method for decomposing proÞt ratios, and gives a justiÞcation to the proposed technique which is based on the economic approach to index numbers by exploiting exactness results between the Törnqvist index and the translog functional form. Comparisons are also made with alternative decomposition techniques in section 3. Section 4 describes the data used in the application and illustrates how to use proÞt decompositions to assess the effects of changes in regulations on Þrm performance. The results of the application of the index-number proÞt decomposition (INPD) are presented in section 5. Interpretations of the proÞt decompositions are provided in section 6 with an assessment of the effects of changes in regulations on the industry. The paper concludes with a review of the method, the results and its applicability to the study of economic performance.
Index-Number Profit Decompositions
To derive the INPD, we Þrst deÞne the variable (or "restricted") non-zero proÞts of an arbitrary Þrm b, π b , relative to the proÞts of another Þrm a, π a :
If Þrm a has the highest proÞts in the sample of Þrms being examined, then its proÞts provide a natural denominator for comparisons. Such a comparison is particularly useful in natural resource industries, such as Þsheries, where there may exist "highliners" who consistently earn proÞts far in excess of their fellow resource users. An important question is why proÞts may be different for the Þrms. Let P a,b be a price index for the "netputs," (i.e., a price index for the outputs and variable inputs, where inputs are treated as negative outputs in order to simplify notation), and Q a,b is the corresponding quantity index. From the "weak factor reversal test" of Fisher (1922) , an important requirement for these indexes is the following:
That is, a price index times the corresponding quantity index should equal the values index, i.e., the ratio of values. Because of our deÞnition of the indexes in terms of "netputs," the value index here is a ratio of proÞts. Equation (2) can be thought of as a "preservation of value" property-price times quantity should equal value in levels, and this should also be true in terms of price changes times quantity changes equaling value changes. If this condition is not satisÞed by a particular choice of index number for P a,b and Q a,b , then we can deÞne either P a,b or Q a,b directly, and the other index is deÞned indirectly. 1 Consider the case where we deÞne P a,b directly. Then we deÞne Q a,b as follows, to ensure that (2) is satisÞed:
Hence, Q a,b is termed an "implicit" index, as it is implicitly deÞned once the "direct" index P a,b has been deÞned (Allen and Diewert, 1981) .
A productivity index between Þrms b and a can be deÞned as an output index divided by an input index, consistent with the usual calculation of total-factor productivity growth (i.e., output growth divided by input growth), as follows:
where K a,b is a (quasi-) Þxed input quantity index. Productivity in (4) is the difference in the implicit netput quantity index, Q a,b , that cannot be explained by differences in Þxed-input utilization, K a,b . By rearranging Equation (4), we obtain:
1 Many commonly used indexes do not satisfy this weak factor reversal test. For example, the Laspeyres, Paasche and Törnqvist indexes do not satisfy this test, while Fisher's Ideal index does satisfy the test. See Allen and Diewert (1981) , and Diewert (1992a) .
where the ratio of Þrms' proÞts can be decomposed into contributions from productivity (R a,b ), price (P a,b ) and Þxed input (K a,b ) differences between the Þrms. Any index number can be used for constructing the price and Þxed-input indexes for use in (5). However, of all possible indexes, the Törnqvist (1936) 
where T is the production possibility set for the Þrm. Hence, proÞt is maximized by the choice of y, subject to the constraint that k is exogenously given in each period. The conditions which deÞne a restricted proÞt function with constant returns to scale are that it is (i) a nonnegative function, (ii) positive homogeneous of degree one in p, (iii) convex and continuous in p for every Þxed k, (iv) positive homogeneous of degree one in k, (v) nondecreasing in k for every Þxed p, and (vi) concave and continuous in k for every Þxed p.
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We consider the case where the log of π in (6) has the translog form (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973; Diewert, 1974; Russell and Boyce, 1974) , such that for Þrm ι = a, b
where α ij = α ji , for i, j = 1, . . . , N,, β lm = β ml , for l, m = 1, . . . , M and the following restrictions hold so that the functional form in (7) exhibits constant returns to scale:
Note that only the second-order terms in (7) are restricted to be constant across Þrms.
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We deÞne the following theoretical productivity index to capture the difference between Þrms a and b in terms of productivity:
where the Þrst ratio in the brackets is an index of productivity difference using Þrm a reference netput prices and capital (exogenous) quantities, and the second ratio is a competing index of productivity change which uses Þrm b reference netput prices and input quantities. Because it is unclear which of these two possible theoretical indexes is preferred, a geometric mean of the two is used in (8). The choice of the geometric mean also facilitates a useful theoretical result from index number theory. Diewert and Morrison (1986) exploited the translog identity of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a) to prove a relationship between the translog functional form and the Törnqvist (1936) index formula and which they use for decomposing the growth in domestic product for a trading economy. 4 In the current context, we apply Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 If the functional form for a proÞt function, π ι , is translog as deÞned by (7) for Þrms ι = a, b and there is competitive proÞt maximizing behavior by both Þrms, then the productivity index in (8) is exactly equal to a Törnqvist implicit netput quantity index,
where s n = (p n y n )/(p · y) is the proÞt share of netput n, using the notation p · y = P p n y n , and
which is a Törnqvist quantity index, where s m = (r m k m )/(p · y) is the proÞt share of Þxed input m.
Proof: Consider a proÞt function π ι (p ι , k ι ), for any Þrm ι. If producers are competitively proÞt maximizing, then from Hotelling's Lemma,
using vector notation, where 5 p denotes the vector of Þrst order derivatives with respect to each element of the price vector p. Following Diewert (1974, p. 140) , we have the following shadow pricing result, where the theoretical capital input price vector for Þrm ι, r ι is now deÞned as a vector of ex post user costs of capital (Diewert and Morrison, 1986; p. 662) :
Assuming constant returns to scale,
using the notation
For proÞt functions that are of the translog form, as in (7), the theoretical productivity index (8) can be re-expressed as follows, for ι = a, b:
which is the productivity index (5), with P a,b as deÞned in (9) and K a,b as deÞned in (10), where equation (14) uses (13) and the "translog identity" of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a; p. 1412) , that in turn uses the "quadratic identity" of Diewert (1976; p. 118) , and equation (15) uses (11), (12), and (13). Q.E.D.
The total-factor productivity index, R a,b incorporates scale effects (Solow, 1957; Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982a; Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang, 1994) .
5 As is discussed in section 5 below, R a,b can be thought of as an efficiency index for Þrm b compared with Þrm a. That is, if Þrm a is a Þrm of interest for Þrm b, then Þrm b is interested in determining the differences in proÞts between the Þrms that cannot be explained by prices faced and input quantities used.
In a similar fashion to the productivity index in (8), we can relate the Törnqvist indexes in (9) and (10) to the translog proÞt function deÞned in (7). Consider the following theoretical 5 It is not possible to separate out these effects unless further assumptions are made. We leave this for future research. netput price index:
It can be shown that if π has the translog form in (7) for both Þrms, then the index in (17) is exactly equal to the Töornqvist price index in (9). It is also possible to consider the effect on proÞts of individual price differences, i.e., for good n, we consider the change in the price of good n while holding everything else constant:
Exploiting the same relationship with the translog functional form in (7) , we can also obtain the following Törnqvist price change index for good n going from Þrm a to Þrm b prices:
Using (19), we can derive the aggregate price index:
where P a,b is the aggregate Törnqvist price index in (9). Thus, it is possible to decompose the aggregate price index, P a,b , into individual price indexes and also decompose P a,b to obtain price indexes for groups of goods and, thus, separate the effects of input and output price changes.
Further, consider the following theoretical input (capital) quantity index:
If π has the translog form in (7) in each period, then the index in (21) is exactly equal to the capital quantity index in (10). In other words, we can analyze the effect on proÞts of differences in individual capital components, i.e., for good m, we consider the change in the quantity of good m while holding everything else constant:
Exploiting the same relationship with the translog functional form in (7), as above, we can then derive the following Törnqvist capital change index for good m:
Using (23), we can derive the aggregate capital index:
where K a,b is the aggregate Törnqvist price index in (10). Hence, it is possible to decompose the aggregate capital index, K a,b , into indexes for individual capital components as well as individual price effects.
Equations (5), (20) and (24) collectively represent a detailed decomposition of proÞts between Þrms a and b that can be applied in a wide range of applications. These equations may be referred to as index-number proÞt decompositions (INPDs).
6 From above, we see that the INPD can be derived from the "economic approach" to index numbers. That is, under certain assumptions, the indexes in the INPD can be derived from theoretical indexes which are well-founded in microeconomic theory.
It should be emphasized that the INPD represented by equations (5), (20) and (24) can be motivated without making any behavioral assumptions or assumptions on the speciÞc form of the technology. The use of the Törnqvist index in (5) can be justiÞed by the axiomatic (or "test") approach to index numbers, as this index satisÞes more reasonable axioms than most commonly-used index numbers, such as the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes (Diewert, 1992b) . In addition, it can be shown that the Törnqvist index closely approximates the Fisher Ideal index, which satisÞes even more axioms. This is a result in numerical analysis and does not depend on assumptions of optimizing behavior (Diewert, 1978) . Thus strong reasons exist for the choice of the Törnqvist index over many other index-number formulae and, moreover, a justiÞcation exists from the axiomatic approach to index numbers for the INPD represented by equations (5), (20) and (24).
Alternative Decompositions
Some alternative decompositions for proÞt comparisons have been suggested by other authors. We describe some of the methods most closely related to our approach and note the relative advantages of our method.
The approach most closely related to ours is that of Humphrey and Pully (1997) . Examining the impact of regulatory reform of the U.S. banking industry in the 1980s, they propose a decomposition of proÞt growth for a bank into technology and "business environment" components. They estimate a proÞt function and use the estimated parameters of this proÞt function to calculate the separate proÞt components and present average results for small and large banks. In their approach, they do not solve the problem of the choice of weights in their indexes for technology and the business environment, and so present two versions of each with equally justiÞable, but competing, results. Their method also is not applied in a cross-sectional context and does not permit a detailed decomposition of a proÞt ratio like the INPD. Kohli (1990) has showed that a translog gross domestic product (GDP) function could be estimated, and the parameters could be used in a decomposition of the growth in GDP using the results of Diewert and Morrison (1986) . Interestingly, Fox and Kohli (1998) compared the index number approach and the theoretically equivalent (from the "economic approach" to index numbers) GDP growth decomposition approach and found that the results were similar to a high order of approximation. Karagiannis and Mergos (2000) use a proÞt-function framework to decompose totalfactor productivity growth (TFP) into technical-change and returns-to-scale contributions. Unfortunately, as with the method of Humphrey and Pully (1997) , their decomposition is not unique, as they propose both input-and output-oriented decompositions. The orientation needs to be determined in order to separate out the contributing components of a constant returns to scale measure of TFP, and this choice is essentially arbitrary. Further, they do not derive a detailed decomposition of a proÞt ratio into components of interest, such as our method yields.
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Diewert (2000) has also proposed a method for decomposing proÞt differences, rather than ratios, into contributing components. This approach draws on the old literature on index numbers in differences, and the Bennet (1920) index (or "indicator") is found to have some nice properties (Diewert, 1998) .
8 An adaptation of the approach to our context has some potential advantages over our method. In particular, its additive nature is very useful in many contexts. The Diewert decomposition of a proÞt difference into price and quantity components (where the quantity component is set up to give "an additive measure of overall efficiency change"), is interesting, but the individual components are difficult to interpret. For example, a price contribution to proÞts in dollars does not convey the relative importance of that price to relative proÞts. If we divide the price contribution by proÞts we can transform the contributions into percentage terms, but on the right-hand side of the decomposition we obtain a proÞt ratio (minus one). Thus a problem with this Bennet indicator decomposition of a proÞt ratio is that it mixes multiplication and addition. Hence, although it is the subject of ongoing research (e.g. Balk, 1999; Balk, Färe and Grosskopf 2001; Grifell-Tatjé and Fox (2002) ; Diewert, Fox and Kohli, 2002) , it seems that, at least for current purposes, the Bennet indicator approach does not work out as neatly as the Törnqvist index approach.
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2000) have also proposed a method for decomposing cost differences using the Bennet indicator and estimated frontiers. Their approach can be used in the proÞt decomposition case, in place of the less-attractive Laspeyres-type indicator used by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999) . Balk (1999) , in a comment on their approach, proposes 7 The authors also claim that the rate of proÞt augmentation is a biased and incorrect measure of the TFP growth, but this is would require them to know the true TFP growth. Unfortunately, they deÞne the true TFP growth measure as the conventional Divisia index of TFP changes which is not the same TFP estimates that are obtained from the proÞt augmentation approach (see, e.g., Diewert and Wales, 1992; Fox, 1996) .
8 Following Diewert (1998) index numbers in differences are termed "indicators" in order to distinguish them from standard index numbers that use ratios. a decomposition which he describes as "more meaningful" (Balk, 1999; p. 6) . Regardless of how these decompositions are performed, they require the calculation of frontiers, which is not needed with the INPD.
Finally, we note some advantages of our method over methods which require the estimation of benchmark frontiers. While frontier analysis is based on the observed data, benchmarking can involve comparing Þrms to parts of the estimated frontier between observations. This means that the shape of the constructed frontier is key for the analysis. In addition, it means that there can be serious "dimensionality" problems-with a small number of observations relative to the number of variables, it is possible for every Þrm to be on some part of the frontier. In our method, this dimensionality problem is avoided. The presentation of our method in this paper implies that price data are needed, and prices are not necessary for basic frontier analysis. However, in the absence of price data, weights can be chosen in their place and the same index numbers calculated, although with a different interpretation. It can be noted that some methods for modifying basic frontier analysis techniques, in order to overcome some of its limitations, also require the speciÞcation of weights (e.g., Färe and Grosskopf, 2000; Golany and Roll, 1994; Thompson et al., 1990; Charnes et al., 1990) .
Application of the INPD
The INPD is applied to the British Columbia (BC) halibut Þshery to assess the effects on proÞts, efficiency and productivity of regulatory changes across Þrms and over time. The method is used to examine the effects of the introduction of individual harvesting rights into the Þshery in 1991 by comparing Þrm-level differences in the periods 1988, 1991 and 1994. Unlike other approaches, the INPD can decompose changes in property rights in terms of output and variable input prices, productivity and utilization of the Þxed-input quantity.
Details of the industry are provided in Grafton, Squires and Fox (2000) . In their study, they compared changes in efficiency between the periods 1988, 1991 and 1994 by estimating a stochastic frontier and deriving Þrm-level measures of economic, allocative and technical efficiency. They found that some measures of efficiency initially fell from 1988 to 1991, but increased from 1991 to 1994. They attribute the initial decline to deÞciencies in the initial characteristics of the individual harvesting rights introduced in 1991, and temporary adjustments by Þshers in the Þrst year of the program.
The stochastic frontier approach cannot easily and neatly decompose proÞt changes into its component parts; productivity changes, input and output price changes and changes in reproducible capital. By contrast, the INPD allows for a comparison of the relative magnitude of the affect of each component on changes in proÞts. In other words, a proÞt decomposition identiÞes which components of proÞts, such as output prices, changed in response to regulations. For example, a shift to individual harvesting rights in 1991 made previous input restrictions on season length redundant and led to a 30 fold increase in the Þshing season (Grafton, Squires and Fox, 2000, p. 685) . The much longer Þshing season, in turn, increased the landings of fresh Þsh, reduced spoilage and damage and contributed to higher output prices for Þshers (Casey et al., 1995) .
The data for the INPD were supplied by the Fisheries and Oceans Canada cost and earnings surveys from an independent random sample of 97, 163 and 54 halibut Þshers in 1988, 1991, and 1994. The halibut ßeet is deÞned as all longline vessels having a plurality of revenue from halibut, and the general ßeet includes all licensed longline vessels that caught halibut. A selection of 105 observations (43 observations for both 1988 and 1991, and 19 observations for 1994) was made from the data using the criteria that all vessels used bottom longline harvesting gear, caught halibut, and their reported revenues matched (within 10 percent) the independently obtained value of halibut landings recorded for each licence holder. Summary statistics of the data are provided in table 1.
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Input prices include home-port fuel prices and were obtained from Chevron Canada and Imperial Oil Canada. The price of labor is an opportunity cost and is derived from the expected weekly earnings in manufacturing that varies by region where the home ports of vessels are located. The measure of Þrm capital is vessel length and, along with the quantity and value of halibut caught by each Þsher, was obtained from Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The output price faced by Þshers is derived from the quantity and value data and varies by vessel based on the time of landings, where the Þsh were landed, and the size and quality of the Þsh harvested. A measure of the natural capital stock comes from the PaciÞc Halibut Commission given in Sullivan, Parma and Leickly (1994) that deÞnes the total weight of the Þsh that can potentially be harvested each season. All prices are deÞned in Canadian dollars for 1994, and are calculated by inßating 1991 and 1988 values by the GDP implicit price index.
Firm-Level Profit Decompositions
The INPD is applied by using Þrm-level data on halibut prices, fuel prices, price for labor and a Þrm-level capital measure represented by vessel length. Assuming competitive and proÞt maximizing behavior and constant returns to scale, then for each Þrm p · y − rk = 0, or p · y = rk = π, where p is output price, y is output, k is capital, r is the rate of return on reproducible capital and π is Þrm proÞt. Under these assumptions, the share of capital in proÞt is equal to one and the capital quantity index in (10) simpliÞes to
In the BC halibut Þshery, the variable inputs are fuel (F) and labor (L) and from equations (5), (20) and (24), our decomposition of the proÞt ratio between Þrm a and Þrm b, (b = 1, . . . , 105), Γ a,b is:
Hence, the proÞt of Þrm b relative to Þrm a can be decomposed to identify the sources of the difference between the Þrms' proÞts. In this decomposition, given in equation (26), differences in proÞt can be explained by differences in productivity, R a,b , the price of halibut faced by the Þrms, P H a,b , the price of labor, P L a,b , the price of fuel faced by the Þrms, P F a,b , and the vessel length, K a,b . The decompositions are, in general, not pure difference indexes, but represent contributions of the components to the proÞt ratio.
For common-pool resources, an important issue to consider is the affect of the natural capital stock on proÞts and productivity. To account for changes due to the stock over the three sample periods, a harvest-adjusted natural capital stock index equal to the ratio of the natural capital stock (measured in metric tons) to the total allowable harvest for the ßeet (TAC), (also measured in metric tons), is deÞned by (27). 1988, 1991, 1994 . The natural capital stock index represents the available biomass per unit of the allowable harvest (total allowable catch). Thus, for a stock-ßow production technology, an increase (decrease) in the biomass, holding the TAC Þxed and all other factors constant, should make it easier (harder) for Þshers to catch the allowable harvest and tend to increase (decrease) proÞts. Using the stock index, a resource adjusted measure of efficiency between Þrms a and b can be deÞned as
where stock a is the value of the harvest-adjusted natural capital stock t in (27) for the year in which the reference Þrm a is observed, and similarly for stock b . If Þrms a and b are observed in the same period then equations (29) and (26) are identical (i.e., Γ a,b = Γ a,b s ). Thus Γ s can be decomposed into the contribution of the natural capital stock and the components of Γ, as given in (26). Γ s may be interpreted as a measure of efficiency as it represents the restricted or variable proÞts achieved given an exogenously determined input, or the natural capital stock per unit of allowable catch. Its decomposition into its component parts provides insights into what factors are responsible for changes in efficiency, and the possible causes of inefficiency across Þrms.
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For comparative purposes, a reference Þrm (a) must be chosen as the benchmark in the INPD given in (29). The choice of the reference Þrm is important because of transitivity. In other words, a different reference Þrm may result in different relative rankings between Þrms. This potential problem is not unique to the INPD, and typically researchers use multilateral index numbers (Caves, Christensen and Diewert 1982b; Hill 1997; Pilat and Rao 1996) . In these multilateral approaches, comparisons are often made to an "average" country/Þrm as 10 In principle, similar decompositions are potentially possibly using estimated "benchmark" data. the denominator. However in the current context, and more generally, a composite or average Þrm is of little interest as an assessment of Þrm performance relative to the most proÞtable Þrm is more insightful. In other words, Þrm-level comparisons to the best performing Þrm, in terms of proÞts, helps identify what factors may be limiting increases in proÞt in the rest of the industry.
11 Thus a natural denominator or reference is the Þrm that maximizes proÞt per unit of the harvest-adjusted natural-capital stock, as deÞned by (29). This reference Þrm is observation 15 from a total of 19 observations in 1994, or observation 101 out of the pooled sample of 105 observations for all sample periods.
An examination of the harvest-adjusted natural-capital stock (27) reveals stock 1988 = (438.76/12.8) = 34.28 for 1988, stock 1991 = (425.06/7.145) = 59.49 for 1991, and stock 1994 = (282.59/8.967) = 31.5 for 1994. Thus, over all periods, it was easiest to catch the TAC in 1991. That is, the harvest constraint was likely to be most binding for the industry in 1991 when the biomass per unit of TAC was greatest. Given that the reference Þrm a is observation 15 in 1994, comparisons among Þrms for the same period are independent of the stock index. For the other two periods, 1988 and 1991, from equation (29) For example, from table 2 , and without adjusting for the natural capital stock, observation 43 has a higher proÞt than the reference Þrm, but lower restricted proÞt after adjusting for the stock variable. In other words, observation 43 has a value of Γ which is greater than one (1.060), but a value of Γ s which is less than one (0.975).
For the decompositions, a value greater than one for the input indexes (P L, P F and K) does not mean that price of the input is higher than for the reference Þrm. Instead, it implies that the contribution of the price of the input to the proÞt ratio is greater than it is for the reference Þrm. A higher contribution of the fuel price to proÞt, for example, may indicate that the price of fuel is lower for the observation in question than that for the reference Þrm because higher fuel prices imply lower proÞts. If fuel prices are identical for the observation in question and the reference Þrm, a P F measure of greater than one implies that fuel costs represent a smaller share of proÞts for the given observation than the reference Þrm. A similar interpretation applies for P L, the opportunity cost of labor.
6 Profit Decompositions and Regulatory Change Table 5 and Þgure 1 reveal important changes in the proÞts and decompositions across the three years of the sample. In particular, table 5 shows that considerable variation exists across the three periods in terms of productivity (R) and the output price (P H). The results indicate that the average contribution of productivity to relative proÞts was highest in 1988 (0.770) and lowest in 1991 (0.277), with a considerable recovery in 1994 (0.486).
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Thus the initial allocation of individual harvesting rights in 1991 is associated with a decline in the contribution of productivity to proÞts. A possible explanation for such an outcome is the adjustments required by Þrms in 1991 in response to a completely different regulatory system. The subsequent increase in the contribution of productivity to proÞt performance from 1991 to 1994 was associated with the trading of the individual harvesting rights that was allowed in 1993. Transferability would have permitted Þrms with relatively higher levels of productivity to increase their share of the harvest by the buying of harvesting rights from relatively less productive Þrms who exited from the Þshery.
The proÞt decompositions may be compared to estimates of changes in efficiency estimated with a production frontier for the same industry and periods. In the frontier analysis, short-run technical cost efficency signiÞcantly declined for both small and large vessels over the period 1988-1991 and increased from 1991-1994 for both vessel classes, but the change was only statistically signiÞcant for small vessels (Grafton, Squires and Fox 2000) . These changes were accompanied by a 28 percent decline in the number of active vessels in the industry between 1988 and 1994. Thus although the INPD and frontier estimates of changes in the Þshery were obtained by very different methodologies, they provide comparable results with initial declines in performance from 1988 to 1991, but subsequent gains from 1991 to 1994. The advantage of the INPD, and unlike the frontier approach, is that it allows us to examine the relative importance of changes in prices (inputs and outputs), capital and productivity on proÞtability across vessels and time periods.
The decompositions summarized in table 5 show that the most striking change in the proÞt decompositions over all vessels occurred with respect to the output price (P H). The increase in the price of halibut is directly attributable to the change in regulations as previously Þshers landed a frozen product caught in a total Þshing season of a few days. By contrast, under the individual quota system the season length increased from 6 days in 1990 to 214 days in 1991. This had two effects. First, it allowed Þshers to land and market fresh halibut which commands a much higher price than the frozen product, which represented most of the sales prior to the introduction of harvesting rights. Second, the increased season length reduced congestion externalities and provided Þshers with much more time to bring their harvest on board and to avoid bruising and damaging of the product and increase the price received (Grafton, Squires and Fox 2000) . Further, these output price increases occurred only for the BC halibut Þshery and not in the Alaska halibut Þshery which, at the time, still operated as a "derby" Þshery (Herrmann 1996) . Overall, the INPD results indicate that the upward shift in output prices had a large and positive impact on the restricted proÞts of Þrms.
Given that all other Þrms have a P H value less than unity, high output prices explain why the reference Þrm had the greatest proÞts per unit of the resource stock. A comparison of the mean value of the P H decomposition in table 5 reveals that, for the Þrms in the sample, increases in the price of halibut was the single biggest factor in improving Þrm performance from 1988 to 1994. Indeed, without the increases in the output prices attributable to the introduction of private harvesting rights, average Þrm performance would have not increased over the 1988-1994 period.
A comparison of the other proÞt decompositions for the fuel input price (P F ), labor input price (P L) and the Þrm-level capital stock (K) reveal little change in the average performance over the three periods. Nevertheless, a relatively lower average fuel price in 1991 is reßected in higher values for P F , or a greater contribution of fuel to the proÞts in 1991 relative to the reference Þrm in 1994. Similarly, the lower average price of labor in 1988 is reßected by the price of labor making positive contributions in 1988 to increasing proÞts relative to the reference Þrm that is observed in 1994. Thus, for this industry, it would seem that the greatest beneÞts associated with a shift to individual harvesting rights in 1991 has been an increase in the output price, directly attributable to a much longer Þshing season.
Another comparison of interest is the effect of vessel size on proÞts and productivity. Figure 1 provides three sets of observations for each of the three observation periods 1988, 1991 and 1994. For each period, observations are ranked in increasing order of vessel size. Interestingly, a positive relationship appears to exist between vessel size and relative proÞts for all three periods, and between vessel size and the output price for the period 1994.
13 It would suggest that increased vessel size is associated with improved economic performance. This Þnding complements the results of Grafton, Squires and Fox (2001) who Þnd that if Þshers were able to freely adjust their vessel size, they could substantially increase their longrun technical cost efficiency. If improved performance is associated with increased vessel size, it suggests that on-going restrictions on vessel size in Þsheries in which halibut Þshers are active participants may be preventing the full economic gains from individual harvesting rights.
Overall, the index decompositions provide a breakdown of the relative importance of regulations on Þrm performance. They suggest, for example, that some of the greatest gains associated with privatization of the commons may arise on the revenue side rather than on the costs or input dimension. The results also indicate that regulatory change can lead to signiÞcant productivity shocks among Þrms, but that Þrms can adjust rapidly to such shifts. In addition, the indexes provide a ready-made comparison of all Þrms relative to the most proÞtable Þrm per unit of resource stock. In turn, this provides useful information for benchmarking across Þrms at a point in time. Such pairings of Þrms to the reference or benchmark indicate what components are contributing most to changes in proÞts, and suggest what may be done to improve overall industry performance.
Concluding Remarks
The paper proposes a new method for assessing Þrm-level economic performance and evaluating changes in industries over time. The method explicitly accounts for changes in the natural capital stock and decomposes contributions to proÞts in terms of productivity, variable input prices, output prices, and reproducible capital. A decomposition, with this level of detail and information, cannot easily and neatly be obtained using standard efficiency and productivity analysis techniques. Moreover, standard efficiency-analysis techniques typically estimate multi-dimensional "benchmark frontiers," whereas only observed data are used in the proposed proÞt-decomposition technique. Further, the method can be justiÞed from either the axiomatic approach to evaluating index numbers, which makes no behavioral assumptions or assumptions on the speciÞc form of technology, or it can be justiÞed from microeconomic theory through the economic approach to index numbers.
The index-number proÞt decomposition has a wide number of potential applications in measuring Þrm, industry and regulatory performance. Using the approach with data from the British Columbia halibut Þshery, the decompositions indicate that the major beneÞt from a shift to individual harvesting rights in the industry in 1991 was an increase in output prices. Further, the results indicate a positive relationship between relative proÞts in the industry and vessel size following the introduction of individual harvesting rights. This suggests that vessel size restrictions imposed upon Þshers may be preventing the full gains in economic performance associated with the introduction of individual harvesting rights.
More generally, the application suggests that the method could be used in many different industries for assessing economic performance and evaluating the effects of regulatory change. For instance, by decomposing proÞt into the contributions of inputs and outputs, Þrms and regulators can identify the most important factors constraining improved performance and can analyze what may be contributing to regulatory success or failure. Further, benchmarking across Þrms, and by decompositions, can assist individual Þrms understand what may be preventing them from increased proÞtability. Ultimately, proÞt and productivity decompositions should prove useful to Þrms and regulators who want better decision-making and improved management and industry performance. 
